Taxation by Culp, Maurice S.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 3
1956
Taxation
Maurice S. Culp
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Maurice S. Culp, Taxation, 7 W. Res. L. Rev. 328 (1956)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol7/iss3/30
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
was considered to be an enforcement problem under the Cosmetology Law,
and the Iden case43 was distinguished on the basis that there was less evi-
dence of control44 in the instant case and an absence of an appearance of
subterfuge.
EDWIN R. TEPLE
TAXATION
Jurisdiction
In the 1954 Survey article on taxation two Ohio Supreme Court de-
cisions dealing with the -taxation of the ownership interests of the de-
positors in mutual savings banks and holding that the tax in question was
valid as imposed on the depositors and not on the banks, were discussed.'
Probable jurisdiction had been noted by the Supreme Court of the United
States.2 In Society for Savings v. Bowers3 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the state tax violated the rule that obligations of the
federal government are immune from state taxation. It refused to follow
the view of the Ohio Supreme Court that the statute imposed a tax upon
the depositors and determined that for federal purposes the tax must be held
to be one on the banks themselves. The most important factor influencing
the Supreme Court was the absence of any right in the bank to make itself
whole from the depositors for the taxes paid on their account; thus, with-
out a right of recoupment the bank -would -bear the impact of the tax and
the court could not assume that the statutes operations would not infringe
on -the immunity of the federal obligations held by the bank.
In State v. Carney4 the Board of County Commissioners of Cuyahoga
County brought a mandamus proceeding against the County Auditor to
require him to execute a note for purposes of raising preliminary funds for
construction of a county subway. One of the grounds for resisting the
granting of the writ was that taxation by the county for the supplying of
public transportation as authorized by state legislation is not a public pur-
s71 Ohio App. 65, 47 N.E.2d 907 (1942).
"No attempt is made in the opinion to analyze or apply concurrent tests contained
in the controlling statutory definition. This is not an uncommon oversight, however,
and the result is consistent with the view expressed by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Commercial Motor Freight, Inc. v. Ebright, 143 Ohio St. 127, 54 N.E.2d 297
(1944), the leading case on this subject. The court in the instant case may be sug-
gesting the complete absence of a service relationship, although the leasing of booths
in a beauty parlor, like the leasing of barber shop chairs, always seems a little sus-
picious. Cf. Alanson W. Wilcox, The Coverage of Unemployment Compensation
Laws, 8 VA mDEmBUILT L REv. 245, 255 (1955); Edwin R. Teple, The Employer-
Employee Relationship, 10 OHIO ST. L J. 153, 158 (1949).
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pose. The statute authorizing the subway to be constructed was held
constitutional. Public transportation is a proper county purpose and func-
tion, and county improvements may be authorized, constructed and main-
tained by the county although they directly benefit only a part of the
taxpayers of the county and even though the proposed subway is to be
constructed -by the county but used by municipally owned transit systems
for public transporation under the terms of a contract with the county.
Another decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio 5 resolved a conflict of
jurisdiction between a city and the state in imposing a tax upon the tax-
payer's income received from income-producing intangibles. The city of
Toledo had imposed a one per cent income tax upon the income from the
plaintiff's intangibles. The Supreme Court examined the statutes regard-
ing the application of the intangibles tax to the income of a securities dealer
which is derived from the income yield of intangibles owned by the dealer,
and held that a municipality may not impose an income tax on that portion
of the net profits of a dealer in intangibles which are derived from the
income yield of intangibles owned by that dealer. Ohio Revised Code
section 5725.26 was held to be a declaration of legislative pre-emption of
this field of taxation, even though the state tax is denominated a property
tax
Specific Taxes
Functionad Depreciation ofReal Property
Taxpayer objected to the original valuation placed on its business
building because of the allowance of an insufficient amount for functional
depreciation or obsolescence, which refers to property in good physical
condition becoming obsolete or useless because of changing business condi-
,tions which render it valueless for tax purposes. The Supreme Court sus-
tained the valuation of the administrative authorities, and predicated its
action on several'grounds, two of which were relevant to the depreciation
controversy: (1) A taxpayer asserting functional depreciation has the
burden of proving facts in support, and (2) a taxpayer who offers the
ISociety for Savings v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 122, 118 N.E.2d 651 (1954); First Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 149, 118 N.E.2d 667 (1954). Both
cases are discussed in 6 WESr. REs. L. REv. 299, 300 (1955).
*348 U.S. 807 (1954).
*349 U.S. 143 (1955); see Annot., State Taxation of Federal Securities and Obliga-
tions, 99 L. Ed. 961 (1955).
'163 Ohio St. 159, 126 N.E.2d 449 (1955).
rOhio Finance Co. v. City of Toledo, 163 Ohio St. 81, 125 N.E.2d 731 (1955).
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opinion of only one witness who fails to substantiate that opinion with
facts and figures, fails to sustain the burden of proof.6
Special Assessments
A court of appeals decision considered the effect which a lapse of nearly
twenty years from the last time that a special assessment had appeared on
a tax duplicate had on the authority of the auditor to place the assessment
back on the duplicate for 1952, the year in dispute. Between 1932 and
1952 it had not appeared, but in 1951 the auditor learned of the omission
and proceeded to restore the item to the duplicate. Action was then
brought to enjoin the enforcement of the assessment lien. The court of
appeals determined that the auditor was without authority because of the
limitations set forth in Ohio Revised Code section 319.40, preventing the
auditor from going back more than five years unless in the meantime the
property has changed ownership, in which case only the taxes chargeable
since the last change of ownership may be charged.7
Tangible Personal Property
Red Top Brewing Co. v. Bowers8 presented three important valuation
questions relative to valuation of property used in business for tax pur-
poses. The taxpayer had one complete plant idle during the tax year
1949 and most of the tax year 1950. It contended that the plant should
be valued at 10 per cent of its original cost. Taxpayer was relying upon
a directive of the Tax Commissioner, but the court held that there was not
statutory authority for any variation from "true value" other than the 50
per cent provision of Ohio Revised Code section 5711.22, and that the
plant which was being held in "stand by" condition without use was con-
sidered to be "used" in business within the meaning of Ohio Revised Code
section 5709.01.
Beer bottle labels held by the manufacturer for applying to bottles to
identify brand, quality and grade and to comply with government regula-
tions, and caustic soda held by the manufacturer for use in cleaning and
washing used bottles for refilling were considered articles held for the pur-
pose of being used in manufacturing or combining, for purposes of apply-
ing the statutory 50 per cent valuation. Finally, the court held that a
valuation of used bottles at the cost of new bottles under circumstances
where not less than 96 per cent of reusable bottles were returned in ex-
change for the two cent deposit, was unreasonable.
*Rollman & Sons Co. v. Board of Revision of Hamilton Co., 163 Ohio St. 363, 127
N.E.2d 1 (1955).
'Bernhard v. O'Brien, 97 Ohio App. 359, 126 N.E.2d 349 (1953).
*163 Ohio St. 18, 125 N.E.2d 188 (1955).
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- The Supreme Court9 reversed the Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax
Commissioner on another determination as to whether a taxpayer was a
"manufacturer" entitled to use the 50 per cent rule. It determined that a
taxpayer who purchased a prepared raw mix in liquid form from a milk
company which it subjected to a cooling-aerating process which induced
some chemical change and dispensed directly from the freezer to customer
or stored for future sale, in a semisolid form resembling ice cream, was
engaged in manufacturing within the meaning of Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 5711.16 and 5711.22.
Intangible Personal Property
Pure Oil Co. v. Peck'0 involved an appeal from a decision -that out-of-
state bank deposits withdrawable -by a corporate depositor domiciled in
Ohio, were subject to the Ohio intangible tax on deposits. It was asserted
by the taxpayer that the funds in question were destined for specific bene-
ficiaries and that taxability should depend on the taxable status of the
person owning the beneficial interest as shown on the books of the corpora-
tion. It was held, in affirming the decision of the Board, that these de-
posits were taxable since they were general in form and not designated as
deposits for any particular purpose.
Miller v. Bowers" was an example of an alleged trust of intangibles
which was unsupported by sufficient evidence of an intent to create a
trust to justify -the avoidance of the 50 per cent penalty imposed for willful
neglect of the taxpayer to return intangible personal property for taxation.
Inheritance
Several years prior to her death, a mother had conveyed real property to
her two sons, without consideration, reserving a life estate in the property.
The probate court held that such a transfer, though an estate vested im-
mediately in the sons, was a transfer destined to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after her death within the meaning and intent of Ohio
Revised Code section 5731.02 and was includible in her estate for in-
heritance tax purposes.' 2
Sales and Use
Rule No. 101 promulgated by the Tax Commissioner of Ohio states
9Jer-Zee, Inc. v. Bowers, 163 Ohio St. 31, 125 N.E.2d 195 (1955).
162 Ohio St. 375, 123 N.E.2d 428 (1954).
163 Ohio St. 421, 127 N.E.2d 201 (1955).
"In re Garbry's Estate, 128 N.E.2d 869 (Ohio Com. Pl., 1955). The court pointed
out that the vesting of tide is not the controlling factor; the important thing is that
the holders of the legal tide did not in fact have the right to possess the property or
to enjoy it, and they could not have either right until her death or her conveyance of
her life interest to them.
19561
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
that charges for making photostats, blueprints and similar articles are not
sles but are charges for services. Upon the basis of this regulation, the
Tax- Commissioner ruled (affirmed by the Board of Tax Appeals) that
sipplies purchased for a blueprinter's processing activities were subject
to a tax on the purchaser as the ultimate consumer. The Supreme Court
reversed these decisions, holding that a person engaged in producing copies
by blueprinting, photostating, oxalidizing and similar processes and
charging'the customer in accordance with the quantity ordered and the type
of processing, is a vendor and not subject to sales and use tax under Ohio
Revised Code sections 5739.02 and 5741.02.13
Under Ohio Revised Code section 5731.01 a construction contract pur-
suant to which tangible personal property is or is to be incorporated into a
structure or improvement, in such a manner that it becomes a part of the
real property, constitutes a sale of tangible personal property for the pur-
poses of the sales tax, if the consideration for the incorporation is agreed
upon, charged or paid separately from the consideration for the performance
of the other obligations of the construction contract. The consideration is
deemed .to be charged separately when stated separately on the vendor's
-books and records, even though neither the contract nor the bills submitted
separately stated the consideration.14
A related problem growing out of the definition of sale and selling
under Ohio Revised Code section 5739.01 (B) came before the court of
appeals. The issue was presented by a taxpayer who was held by the Tax
Commissioner and the Board of Tax Appeals to be engaged in production
and fabrication work in its establishment which sold retail ready-made
clothes and fur garments for women. It did a great deal of remodeling
and restyling as well as repairing of fur garments. The Tax Commissioner
contended that all of these transactions were sales in which the full con-
sideration or charge made to the customer is the base upon which the sales
tax must be computed. Rule No. 38 of the Tax Commissioner was also
under attack on this appeal. Taxpayer was unsuccessful in securing a re-
versal of the Board for failure of proof of prejudice in -the record, but the
court of appeals, in sustaining Rule No. 38, applied the following test to
determine whether a particular activity is production or fabrication: "Under
the provisions of the statute and Rule 38 the test to be applied in de-
termining whether the taxpayer is engaged in production or fabrication
does not lie in the process used, but whether the finished article is sub-
stantially different from the original article." Under this test merely re-
styling, shortening, recutting, remodeling or revitalizing without
' City Blue Printing Co. v. Bowers, 163 Ohio St. 6, 125 N.E.2d 181 (1955).
"'Kloepfer v. Peck, 162 Ohio St. 427, 123 N.E.2d 274 (1954).
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substantially altering the form or shape of an existing article is.not "produc-
tion or fabrication."' 5  ., % "
One decision16 dealt with the leasing of pari-mutuel wager-ticket-
issuing machines as a taxable sale or use. The equipment was furnished.
by an independent owner and manufacturer and was serviced and kept in
repair by employees of the latter in return for a percentage of daily wagers.
This was held to constitute a lease of the equipment and a taxable sale or
use within the meaning of Ohio Revised Code section 5739.01 and 5741.01,
and not merely a service to the track operator.
Corporate Franchise
In 1954, the Supreme Court of Ohio in the Fifth Third Union Trust
case' 7 held that the franchise tax on an Ohio domestic corporatior" for
profit, levied under the provisions of Ohio Revised Code section 5495
et seq., should have as its base the value of the issued and outstanding shares
of stock. This value must be determined by including all of its assets
without deduction therefrom of the value of any federal securities owned
by such corporation. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position on this
matter during, 1955.18
Highway Use
One Supreme Court case required a decision as to whether the "axle-
mile tax" imposed by Ohio Revised Code section 5728.06 should apply to
Michigan motor vehicles operated through Ohio in interstate commerce in
view of a legally authorized reciprocity agreement between Michigan and
Ohio which agreement contained a waiver and exemption from "weight'
and "mileage" taxes on commercial motor vehicles. The Court held that
the valid agreement still in effect was not superseded by the later enacted
I Leakas Furriers, Inc. v. Bowers, 129 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio App. 1954). The taxpayer
was unsuccessful for two reasons: (1) he did not separate the consideration charged,
and (2) no error on the matter of a breakdown was specified in the notice of ap-
peal to the Board of Tax Appeals.
" Randall Park Jockey Club, Inc. v. Peck, 162 Ohio St. 245, 122 N.E.2d 787 (1954).
' Fifth Third Union Trust Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 169, 118 N.E.2d 398 (1954).
This case overruled Wrenn Paper Co. v. Glander, 156 Ohio St. 583, 103 N.E.2d 756
(1952), opinion by Judge Hart, arguing that federal securities are to be excluded
from th'e determination of the franchise tax.
'
5Raymond Bag Co. v. Bowers, 163 Ohio St. 275, 126 N.E.2d 321 (1955). The
per curiam opinion of the court relies upon its decision in the Fifth Third Union
Trust case. Judge Hart, however, in a concurring opinion, now joins the majority
in holding the vieW that the franchise tax does not violate any federal immunity of
federal securities from state taxation. His position was that the tax is on the fran-
chise and not on the property of the corporation, or even upon the value of the shares
of the corporation.
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"axle-mile tax." The Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of the
axle-mile tax statute.19
Procedure
Appeals
The decisions of the Tax Commissioner may be appealed to the
Board of Tax Appeals.20 Compliance with the specific and mandatory
provisions of the cited code section, governing the notice of appeal are
essential to confer jurisdiction on the Board of Tax Appeals, and its dis-
missal of an appeal for failure to comply with the mandatory jurisdictional
statute requirements will be sustained by the courts."'
While most of the appeals from the decisions of the Board of Tax
Appeals are taken to the Supreme Court of Ohio, the statute 2 confers
concurrent jurisdiction upon the court of appeals of the county in which
the taxed property is situated or in which the taxpayer resides. On such
an appeal, the court of appeals held that the rules of the court of appeals
did not apply to such procedure, but that it is controlled by Ohio Revised
Code section 5717.04 except as to the time within which briefs must be
filed which time, until fixed by general rule of the court, is controlled by
special order.
23
Scope of Appeal
The appellant from the decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals de-
termines the scope of the judicial review through the notice of appeal which
he files pursuant to statute.24 He is required to set forth the decision of
the board appealed from and the errors therein complained of, in such
notice of appeal. It has been held that the appellant-taxpayer cannot broad-
en the scope of review beyond the errors complained of in the notice.25
' Interstate Motor Freight System v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St 122, 128 N.E.2d 97
(1955). Judge Taft, in a dissenting opinion, contended that the 1937 reciprocity
agreement between Ohio and Michigan could not reasonably be interpreted to exempt
Michigan truckers from the axle-mile tax.
"OHIO REV. CODE § 5717.02.
'Lee Jewelry Co. v. Bowers, 162 Ohio St. 567, 124 N.E.2d 415 (1955). The
Board dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal con-
mined no copy of the Commissioner's final determination as required by OHio REV.
CODE § 5717.02.
"OHIo REv. CODE § 5717.04.
' Miami Cigar & Tobacco Co. v. Peck, 97 Ohio App. 37, 123 N.E.2d 537 (1954).
3"OHIo REv. CODE § 5717.04, 5th para., which in addition provides that the court
in which notice of appeal is first filed, has exclusive jurisdiction of the appeal.
' Leakas Furriers, Inc. v. Bowers, 129 NE.2d 478 (Ohio App. 1954).
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Review on Facts
Often appeals present questions of fact, and some of them are dose.
The Supreme Court has stated that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the Board on factual issues but "only to determine
from an examination of the entire record whether the decision reached
by the Board is unreasonable or unlawful."28 In two cases before it dur-
ing 1955, it affirmed the factual decisions of the Board because it deemed
such decisions to be neither unreasonable nor unlawfu 2T In one case it
reversed and remanded28 because the record did not contain evidence to
support the county board of revision while there was evidence supporting
the taxpayer's contention.
Law Applied on Appeal
Reference has been made previously to the Fifth Third Union Trust
case which overruled the Wrenn case, on the matter of including the value
of federal securities in the valuation base for determining the franchise
tax on domestic corporations2 9 -A number of applications for certificates
for abatement of franchise taxes were filed for the years from 1947 to
1951 on the ground that the value of federal securities owned by appli-
cants had been illegally included in the tax base. The Tax Commissioner
denied the applications on the authority of the Fifth Third Union Trust
case. The Supreme Court affirmed his decision.30 It applied the general
rule that a decision of "a court of supreme jurisdiction" overruling a
former decision is retrospective in its operation with the effect that the
former decision was never the law, noting an exception where contractual
rights had arisen or vested rights had been acquired under the prior de-
cision. It then went on to state that the assessment and payment of a tax
does not grow out of a contractual relationship, and that there was no
showing of any right having become vested in these parties under the prior
decision.
Refunds
A number of cases deal with the special problems of refunds under
specific taxes. In one case the Tax Commissioner refused an application
for a refund of sums paid under the axle-mile tax, Ohio Revised Code
"The Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 163 Ohio St. 63, 125 N.E.2d 342 (1955).
" Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, supra note 26; G. M. Baker & Son, Inc. v. Bowers, 164
Ohio St. 121, 128 N.E.2d 14 (1955).
" The Cleveland Trust Co. v. Board of Revision of Cuyahoga County, 163 Ohio St.
579, 127 N.E.2d 748 (1955).
"See notes 17 and 18, supra.
"Peerless Electric Co. v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 209, 129 N.E.2d 467 (1955).
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section 5728.06, because the specific refund provision did not apply to
axle-miles traveled in Ohio. ThIs decision was reversed on the ground that
the general refund -provision, Ohio Revised Code section' 5703.05, was
applicable and that this empowered the Tax Commissioner, upon finding
an overpayment, to issue a certificate of abatement0a
The other cases concerned refund applications under the sales tax.
Claim was made for a refund of tax paid on trucks because of the trucks
being purchased for use directly in the production of tangible personal
property. However, the vendor-applicant did not obtain any certificate
of exemption from the purchaser prior to the sale. The Supreme Court
held that payment of the tax under such circumstances was not erroneous
and the vendor was not entitled to a refund.3 2
In the other refund case under the sales taxi the Court 3 held that the
Tax Commissioner's Rule 132 does not apply to a vendor operating under
Ohio Revised Code section 5739.05. This section applies to a vendor
authorized to prepay the sales tax because collection in the usual manner
is not practicable. The thrust of the sale tax in such a: situation is upon
the vendor, and, whenever he pays the tax illegally or erroneously, he is
entitled to a refund, without the necessity of showing that the consumer
has been reimbursed or has agreed to await repayment until the refund
application has been determined, as required by Rule 132.
Tax Liens
An interesting court of appeals decision was concerned with the con-
flicting claims of the federal government, the State of Ohio, the mortgagees
and the judgment lienholders in the proceeds of a judicial sale of property
where there was an insufficient recovery to pay all preferred claimants. This
conflict arises from the different priority provisions of federal and state laws.
Under the federal lien section3 4 the federal lien for taxes is given priority
over all other liens, except those of mortgagees and judgment lienholders.
Under Ohio Revised Code section 5719.25 -the lien of the State of Ohio for
taxes is given priority over all other liens. But by act of Congress the
federal lien is given priority over the state lien. The Court3 5 worked out
'a Interstate Motor Freight System v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 122, 128 N.E.2d 97
(1955).
'Steubenville White Truck Sales and Service, Inc. v. Peck, 162 Ohio St. 251, 122
N.E.2d 790 (1954).
' Terrell, d/b/a Cole Bros. Circus v. Bowers, 163 Ohio St. 72, 125 N.E.2d 332
(1955).
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5 3672.
'Southern Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Bolce, 125 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio App.
1955).
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